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Background: During 2009-2012, Avahan, a large donor funded HIV/AIDS prevention program in India was
transferred from donor support and operation to government. This transition of approximately 200 targeted
interventions (TIs), occurred in three tranches in 2009, 2011 and 2012. This paper reports on the management
practices pursued in support of a smooth transition of the program, and addresses the extent to which standard
change management practices were employed, and were useful in supporting transition.
Results: We conducted structured surveys of a sample of 80 TIs from the 2011 and 2012 rounds of transition. One
survey was administered directly before transition and the second survey 12 month after transition. These surveys
assessed readiness for transition and practices post-transition. We also conducted 15 case studies of transitioning TIs
from all three rounds, and re-visited 4 of these 1-3 years later.
Results: Considerable evolution in the nature of relationships between key actors was observed between transition
rounds, moving from considerable mistrust and lack of collaboration in 2009 toward a shared vision of transition
and mutually respectful relationships between Avahan and government in later transition rounds. Management
practices also evolved with the gradual development of clear implementation plans, establishment of the post of
“transition manager” at state and national levels, identified budgets to support transition, and a common minimum
programme for transition. Staff engagement was important, and was carried out relatively effectively in later rounds.
While the change management literature suggests short-term wins are important, this did not appear to be the
case for Avahan, instead a difficult first round of transition seemed to signal the seriousness of intentions regarding
transition.
Conclusions: In the Avahan case a number of management practices supported a smooth transition these
included: an extended and sequenced time frame for transition; co-ownership and planning of transition by both
donor and government; detailed transition planning and close attention to program alignment, capacity
development and communication; engagement of staff in the transition process; engagement of multiple
stakeholders post transition to promote program accountability and provide financial support; signaling by actors in
charge of transition that they were committed to specified time frames.* Correspondence: sbennett@jhu.edu
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If the health services provided by donor-funded programs
are to be sustained, then at some point in their lives such
projects will need to transition to local ownership, mean-
ing that responsibilities for both funding and running the
program will be taken over by local actors. The stimuli for
such transitions vary: perhaps economic growth means
that the country no longer needs donor support, or donor
priorities have shifted to other issues. Regardless of the
reasons for transition, the transition process itself may be
challenging with a risk of disruptions to services, and in
the most extreme instances, their discontinuation. This
paper aims to identify management practices that support
effective transition, and explore why particular practices
appear to be successful.
The concepts of transition, country ownership and
sustainability can be confusing, and are not explained in
a consistent fashion in the literature. Often the overarch-
ing goal is to ensure program sustainability, whether this
is measured as maintenance of health benefits or the
continued supply of services [1, 2]. While the term coun-
try ownership has been very diversely defined in the devel-
opment literature [3], we understand it as the ability of
actors (both public and private) within the country to
provide vision and leadership, financial support and
implementation capacity to manage a program. There
may be varying degrees of country ownership [4], for
example a country may provide strong political leader-
ship to a program but not be able to provide sufficient
financing for that program. Transition is the process
through which greater country ownership and sustain-
ability are achieved. There are different ways in which a
transition can be thought to be ‘”effective”. For example
a transition may be particularly effective at promoting
country ownership, or ensuring the sustainability of
health outcomes. In this paper our focus is on the short
term. We examine how management practices support
a smooth transition, that is, services are handed over to
local owners with minimal disruption. While a smooth
transition is not the ultimate goal of transition, it ap-
pears likely to be on the critical pathway to sustainabil-
ity, in the sense that services may never recover from
disruptive transition processes.
Several papers have sought to describe what should be
done to support an orderly program transition that max-
imizes the likelihood that programs will be sustained
post-transition. Factors typically highlighted include the
need for high level political leadership of transition; close
communication and coordination with local partners, par-
ticularly government; early planning for transition; strat-
egies to build local organizational capacity; and a phased
approach to transition [5–8]. However, most such papers
focus primarily on negotiation of the overall transition
process with local stakeholders (primarily government)rather than operational aspects of transition management.
These questions are becoming particularly pressing as the
US Presidential Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)
increasingly seeks to transition its HIV programming [9].
Early evidence from South Africa suggested that there
were multiple disruptions to antiretroviral programs as
PEPFAR transitioned, including stock-outs of ARV and
TB drugs, long wait times, and poorly prepared staff
[10]. Agency reports are seeking to provide guidance on
good management practices during transition processes
[11, 12], but typically these are based on anecdotal cases
or prospective analysis, rather than rigorous research, as
there is an extremely limited research base to support
understanding of this question.
In thinking about management practices which might
support program transition we drew upon the change
management literature, particularly that which reflected
the operational challenges relevant to health programs
[13]. Change management, like transition management,
concerns high-level organizational change that em-
bodies the organization’s strategic goals. Further, change
management focuses in particular on the human and re-
lational aspects of change, which prior reports in this
field have suggested to be important [14]. While there is
substantial debate within the change management lit-
erature about the relative merits of intermittent versus
continuous change, and planned versus emergent change,
there appears to be greater consensus regarding practical
guidance for emergent change. Both studies specific to the
health sector [15, 16] as well as broader change manage-
ment frameworks [17, 18] emphasize a number of key
themes including:-
i. Developing a vision, and mobilizing commitment
and leadership for change – create a clear vision
and common direction, and develop effective
individual or distributed leadership for change
ii. Crafting an implementation plan or strategy –
develop supportive organizational systems and
structures
iii. Engaging staff – identify the human consequences
of change and take actions to address these
consequences; align staff with organizational goals;
develop necessary skills for them to operate
effectively in the new organization
iv. Communicating and informing stakeholders –
encourage stakeholder participation and empower
broad-based action; bridge intra- and inter-
organizational divides so that everyone knows what
is going on and can work together
v. Generating short term wins – maintain a focus on
results; monitor results and adjust strategy if
problems appear to arise; disseminate early wins so
as to ease the way for further change.
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Our data come from an assessment of the transition of
the Avahan HIV/AIDS prevention program in India [19].
Between 2003 and 2012 the Avahan Initiative, supported
by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF),
worked in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and
Tamil Nadu (as well as two states in north-east India) to
provide HIV/AIDS prevention services to high risk groups
(HRG). In each state, a State Lead Partner (SLP), either an
international Non-Government Organization (NGO) or a
large domestic NGO, oversaw and supported a series of
Targeted Interventions (TIs) that were run by local NGOs
that provided services to key populations (primarily fe-
male sex workers, men who have sex with men, and trans-
genders) including peer education, testing and treatment
for sexually transmitted infections (STIs) (often accom-
panied by other general health services), distribution of
condoms, sensitization of health care providers and police,
and community mobilization [20, 21]. Individual TIs
(numbering approximately 200 in total) were transferred
to government under the oversight of State AIDS Control
Societies (SACS) in their respective states, with 10 % of
the TIs transitioned in 2009, approximately 20 % in 2011
and the remaining 70 % in 2012 [22]. Table 1 provides an
overview of key Avahan and government actors in the
transition process at multiple levels of the health system.
From early on, BMGF staff recognized that the program
should ultimately be transitioned to its local owners. This
was reflected in a preliminary 2006 and more detailed
2009 Memorandum of Cooperation between Avahan and
the National AIDS Control Organization (NACO) that
clearly stated the time frame and tranches for transition
[23, 24]. Further, the National AIDS Control Programme
III (NACP III) [25] provided a policy framework that
reflected the activities that Avahan TIs had been undertak-
ing, and indeed the government was already supporting
many of its own TIs to provide the same services. Finally,
lack of funding was not a problem, with a total budget forTable 1 Key actors in the Avahan initiative transition process
Level Government
National National AIDS Control Organization (NACO) respo
strategy and oversight of national AIDS control p
State State AIDS Control Societies (SACS) government a
oversee HIV/AIDS services within the state and m
contracts with organizations providing targeted
interventions
Technical Support Units (TSU) contracted units de
provide technical support to HIV prevention prog
District and Community
level
District AIDS Prevention and Control Units (DAPC
responsible for district level planning and monito
Targeted interventions - NGOs or Community Bas
Organizations contracted by SACS to provide HIV
prevention services
*We use the term “Avahan” to refer to the whole array of partners involved in implNACP III activities of US$2.5 billion, approximately two
thirds of which was allocated to prevention, with one third
of this targeted at high risk groups, the program was rela-
tively well funded by government [26]. In light of these
factors, it is safe to say that there was strong national pol-
icy level support for the transition process – but by 2009
the greatest challenge lay in operationalizing the transition
at the state and local level. Our analysis of management
practices focuses primarily on the TI level and the state
level actors who supervised and supported TIs.
Methods
We conducted a prospective evaluation of the transition
of the Avahan program during the period 2009–2013. This
paper describes management practices during the three
rounds of transition in 2009, 2011 and 2012. While the
first transition tranche (2009) was implemented quickly,
with limited planning, there was considerable time for
transition preparation and careful management of transi-
tion in the second and third rounds. This contrast be-
tween the first relatively poorly managed round, and the
better managed second and third rounds allows us to
analyze the management practices adopted over time, and
how they contributed to a smoother transition.
In presenting our analysis of management practices we
draw upon three study components:
– Transition readiness survey - a quantitative assessment
of the “transition readiness” of all 27 TIs that
transitioned in 2011 and a sample of 53/154 TIs that
transitioned in 2012, randomly selected at the state
level with number selected proportional to size.
This assessment was conducted through a structured
survey with some open-ended questions administered
to the managers of the TIs. The survey examined
critical areas of transition readiness, encompassing
communication of the transition process, capacity
building for transition and alignment of the programAvahan*
nsible for
rogram
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questions that explored for example, the number
of staff who had been trained for transition, which
aspects of services had been aligned, and to whom
news about the transition had been conveyed. Where
possible, responses were checked against objective
sources (e.g. Annual reports)
– Follow-up survey - the same sample of TIs that had
been surveyed for transition readiness were
surveyed again approximately 12–18 months after
transition had occurred, using a structured survey
with some open-ended questions. Like the transition
readiness survey this was administered to the
managers of TIs, and included a mix of opinion-
based questions (e.g. Are government actors as
committed to HIV prevention services as Avahan
was?) and fact-based questions that sought to
examine the maintenance of various management
practices after transition. Again, where possible,
responses were checked against documentary data.
A smaller number of TIs were surveyed in the
follow-up survey (N = 70) as some TIs had been
merged with others.
– Longitudinal case studies - case studies of 15 TIs
were conducted shortly after the transition process
was complete. Four of these TIs were revisited for
further data collection one to three years later.
The case studies were selected so as to maximize
variation across states and the type of key population
served. Primarily qualitative data were collected, and
within each TI in-depth interviews were conducted
with TI managers, representatives of the Avahan
SLPs (who had managed the program under
Avahan) and SACS (who managed the program
once government took over), as well as focus group
discussions with key populations, including peer
outreach workers. In total, across the 15 TIs, we
conducted 83 in-depth interviews and 45 focusble 2 Sample of Targeted Interventions (TIs) for structured survey
Andhra Pradesh Karnataka
ansition preparedness survey (before transition)
11 Round 11 6
12 Round 16 17
llow-up survey (12 months after transition)
11 Round 11 5
12 Round 13 12
se studies
09 Round 1 1
11 Round 1 2
12 Round 2 1
visits 1 (2009) 1 (2009)group discussions. These interview data were
supplemented by relevant TI documents and
routine health information data.
Table 2 provides a summary of the numbers of TIs
sampled for each of the study components, by transition
round. All instruments were administered by trained
Indian researchers who used appropriate local languages.
Quantitative data and short open-ended responses to
the transition readiness and follow-up surveys were
translated into English, and entered into and analyzed
in Excel. Analysis sought to compare the degree of
transition readiness, and perspectives on the outcomes
of transition by round, by state and by population
served.
Qualitative data from the case studies were tran-
scribed, translated and analyzed using Atlas.ti. Themes
in the data were initially coded according to key issues
in the overarching research protocol that included tran-
sition preparedness, changes to services, the smooth-
ness of transition, lessons learned, and relationships
between different actors. Sub-codes within these themes
focused on specific issues, such as staff training for tran-
sition, changes in budget, staffing etc. A case study pro-
file of each TI was constructed combining qualitative
and quantitative data. This paper draws findings from
across the 15 case studies, identifying key findings
around the aspects of the change management frame-
work identified below.
This study was ethically reviewed by Johns Hopkins
School of Public Health Institutional Review Board and
exempted. Within India it was reviewed and approved
by YRG Care Institutional Review Board.Results
Findings are organized around the five practical themes
for change management identified above.s and case studies








1 (2011) 1 (2011) 4
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leadership for change
The vision behind the Avahan transition was set at the
national level by BMGF and NACO as articulated in the
2006 and 2009 Memoranda of Cooperation [23, 24], but
effective implementation of that vision required the
mobilization of commitment and leadership for change
throughout the system. In the first round of transition,
2009, it was clear that there was not a sense of joint lead-
ership or a vision for change that was shared by Avahan
actors, and state-level government actors. Instead, the
2009 transition process was frequently characterized by
animosity and mistrust between Avahan and government
actors. For example, one respondent in government de-
scribed how he had heard TI staff referring to the transi-
tion as an arranged marriage:
“A love marriage would be about preference or liking.
In an arranged marriage you have the partner - may
be it is forcefully, so you have to like the partner whom
you have married. So this kind of comment was
not very well taken” Maharashtra, Government,
2009 Round.
In the first round this sense of mutual mistrust and
lack of buy-in to the transition process manifested par-
ticularly strongly with respect to baseline evaluations
undertaken by NACO prior to the transition in order to
assess the quality of TIs it was taking over.
“NACO said that whichever TI we are going to take,
we will evaluate them first and this evaluation would
be done centrally to understand what Avahan has
been doing…… So, that exercise was done by NACO in
consideration with the SLPs. In Karnataka also the
same thing happened and the TIs were evaluated and
some of these evaluation reports were also pretty
depressing. It did not paint a very good picture. And
there were also issues between the SACS people and
[name of NGO] as well. So, there were other
interpersonal issues which also came up in these
reports.” Karnataka, Government, 2009 Round,
However, in the 2011 and 2012 rounds of transition,
both SACS and Avahan worked towards much more
trusting and mutually respectful relationships, withTable 3 TI manager perceptions of government commitment towa
Strong
SACS has the same or a higher level of commitment
toward the program as compared to Avahan
2011 Round 18 %
2012 Round 29 %
The NGO/CBO and SACS share a common vision
for HIV prevention
2011 Round 86 %
2012 Round 83 %leadership of the transition process effectively shared
between both partners.
“Transition doesn’t happen only because of a few
people working for it, what I feel is that transition
primarily happens if you have a good system and a
good rapport in place….So the most important thing
that I realized in this doing the transition process is
that good personal touch or interpersonal relations
matter a lot during transition, doing such a big thing
like the transition… I feel that if you don’t have good
interpersonal relations at a higher up level then like
anything can go wrong at any point of time”.
Maharashtra, SLP, 2011 Round“They [SACS] have cordial relationship with us. Most
of the time we will resolve the issues…., jointly we go
and address…So any issues immediately they call me,
or I do call them. So immediately we will address the
issues.” Tamil Nadu, SLP, 2012 Round
Although the 2011 and 2012 rounds of transition were
not free of troubles or tension, particularly when staffing
transitions meant that new relationships had to be forged,
the foundation of strong relationships between key actors
supported joint problem-solving. Through the progressive
rounds of transition, enhanced commitment, clear joint
leadership and greater role clarity developed among state
level actors in most cases. In turn, this appeared to con-
tribute to a growing sense among TI level staff that SACS
provided clear leadership to the HIV/AIDS prevention
agenda (see Table 3).
Craft an implementation plan or strategy
In the 2009 round of transition there had been very lim-
ited scope for implementation planning given the tight
timelines. Often debates about which TIs should transi-
tion in the first round were still ongoing immediately
preceding transition. In some instances it appeared that
there was also a lack of appreciation for the level of ef-
fort, time and planning that transition would entail, from
all actors:
“See, at that point of time, there was very little
experience on transitioning itself, at that point of time,
there was pretty much no national guideline onrd the program 12 months after transition (follow-up survey)
ly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree No Response
64 % 11 % 4 % 0 % 4 %
48 % 14 % 7 % 0 % 2 %
14 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
14 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 2 %
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is that we all felt that the programme could just be
taken over. The only thing which we would need to do
would be to actually re-align the clinic programme. So,
rest of the things are already functioning within the TI
settings. So, we did not really see much of a challenge
and not much of, what do you call, transitioning
preparedness as compared to now.” Karnataka,
Government, 2009 Round
This lack of planning during the first round manifested
itself in several ways. There were no budget lines in the
Avahan budget dedicated to transition, nor staff with a
particular mandate to focus on transition. Communication
between concerned stakeholders was often poor (as de-
scribed above). Government contracts typically did not
materialize until several months after the formal transition
handover and during these months TIs struggled with fi-
nancial flows, and procuring condoms and other supplies.
While there was recognition of the need to align clinical
services, management and reporting structures with gov-
ernment norms, frequently this process was incomplete at
the time of transition. Even if salaries and budgets had
been aligned, TIs had not had sufficient time to adjust to
the new funding processes.
Also, during the first round of transition, arrange-
ments for SLP support to TIs after transition were con-
tentious. There were no formal agreements in place for
post-transition support, and in some states SACS asked
SLPs to cease contact with TIs after transition. However,
during the second transition round, this issue was tackled
directly and post-transition support agreements between
the SLP and SACS were negotiated prior to transition.
These agreements clearly specified what support the SLPs
would provide to TIs after transition and this helped clear
up confusions around roles.
Indeed in the run up to the second (2011) round of tran-
sition, Avahan developed a much more structured and
planned approach. Each SLP hired a transition manager re-
sponsible for overseeing the transition process, and a na-
tional level transition manager was also appointed by
BMGF. Transition plans were developed with dedicated
budgets to support transition processes. Based upon the
transition readiness surveys, preparation for transition
started much earlier: during the 2011 round, efforts to pre-
pare TIs for transition started on average 6 months before
transition, and for the 2012 round this increased to
9 months. Transition preparation efforts encompassed staff
training to prepare people for the transition, alignment of
both clinical and administrative structures, as well as the
accumulation of buffer stocks in case of a gap in supplies
and financial reserves at the time of transition. By the third
transition round (2012) these elements had been formal-
ized by Avahan in a “common minimum programme” [27]for transition that was used to guide the transition prep-
aration process across the large number of transitioning
TIs (Table 4).
Significant effort was invested in aligning both clinical
and non-clinical elements of the program. For example,
most clinical services had to be shifted from direct deliv-
ery by the TIs (e.g. through clinics at the drop-in-center)
to referrals to government health facilities. Frequently
SACS sought to sensitize workers at government clinics
prior to or at the time of transition so that they behaved
in a manner that did not stigmatize or discriminate
against the HRGs. Further, TIs had to switch their pro-
curement channels so that they procured medicines for
STIs and condoms from government suppliers rather
than the SLP. Overall, by the second round, these shifts
in the clinical and non-clinical management of the pro-
gram appeared to be handled successfully. The transition
readiness study showed relatively high alignment of
Avahan TIs with government norms at the time of tran-
sition for both the 2011 and 2012 rounds (Table 5).
Where alignment was not high e.g. for the procurement
of STI syndromic management medicines, this was due
to the fact that TIs had built up buffer stocks, thus delay-
ing the shift to procurement through government systems.
A similarly positive picture emerged with respect to align-
ment of non-clinical services, including budgets, TI team
structures and reporting systems.Engage staff
Communication among upper and middle-level managers
was typically very good in the 2011 and 2012 transition
rounds, but front-line staff tended to be less well informed
about transition. As the Avahan transition Common
Minimum Programme suggests, in the 2011 and 2012
rounds a considerable amount of effort was targeted at
training TI staff for their roles post-transition and com-
municating the transition process to staff members.
Findings from the transition readiness survey suggest
the numbers of meetings held prior to transition in-
creased between 2011 and 2012, with greater involve-
ment by lower level staff.
There were improvements over time in the amount of
training on transition provided to TI staff. For example
in 2012, approximately 70 % of transitioning TIs had two
or more staff members trained in the different transition
modules (TI guidelines, programming, outreach planning,
condom programming, community mobilization, commu-
nication etc.) compared to 55 % of TIs in the 2011 transi-
tion round and virtually none in Round 1. It remained the
case, however, that higher level staff were more likely to
receive training than lower level staff, and for the 2012
round, some staff training took place as late as March, just
one month before transition.
Table 5 Alignment of Avahan TIs with government clinical and non-clinical norms at the time of transition
Round 2 (2011) Round 3 (2012)
Low Medium High Low Medium High
Is the NGO/CBO following the STI syndromic management guideline of NACO?1 15 % 0 % 85 % 2 % 13 % 85 %
Does the NGO/CBO procure STI syndromic management medicines as per NACO/SACS
guidelines?2
37 % 7 % 56 % 53 % 9 % 38 %
Has there been any change in the condom procurement process?3 26 % 7 % 67 % 15 % 11 % 74 %
Has there been any change in the budget as per NACO/SACS guidelines?4 0 % 7 % 93 % 2 % 11 % 87 %
Has there been any change in the reporting format: are you sending reports to
SACS/District AIDS Control Societies?5
0 % 4 % 96 % 8 % 2 % 89 %
Has there been any change in team structure: are you following SACS/NACO guidelines?6 0 % 7 % 93 % 0 % 4 % 96 %
How aligned is the present ratio of peer educators to high risk groups with the SACS norms?7 0 % 4 % 96 % 0 % 8 % 92 %
1Low: Avahan guidelines are still in place; Medium: Some changes are made according to NACO guidelines; High: Following STI syndromic management
guidelines of NACO.
2Low: Avahan supply chain is still in place; Medium: Some changes are made in the procurement processes as suggested by NACO/SACS; High: STI syndromic
management medicines are procured as per NACO/SACS guidelines
3Low: Process not initiated; Medium: Some changes are made in the condom procurement processes; High: All condom procurement is done through channels
suggested by SACS
4Low: No change, still following Avahan budget; Medium: Some changes were made to the budget; High: Following NACO/SACS budget guidelines
5Low: No change in reporting format; Medium: SACS formats discussed but not all introduced; High: Following all SACS formats
6Low: No change in team structure; Medium: Some changes were introduced; High: Following SACS TI structure
7Low: Ratio was not previously measured; Medium: Ratio is measured and approaching that of SACS; High: Following the SACS ratio
Table 4 Core elements of Avahan common minimum programme for transition
Nature of Activity Description Responsible Actors Timing
Planning Develop a step-by-step plan for each round




12 months prior to handover
Selection of TIs Develop criteria to select TIs to be transitioned. SLP, SACS, TSU 12 months prior





Conduct mock joint assessments SLP 3-6 months prior
Conduct joint assessment visits to finalize selection SLP, SACS, TSU 3-6 months prior
Staff orientation Training for SLP staff, CBO and NGO staff and
district officers in different aspects of transition
SLPs 6, 3 and 1 month prior
Alignment Align Avahan TI contracts with government norms SLP Started earlier over rounds: approx.
12 months prior in 2012 round
Ensure TIs follow all government administrative
norms (Budget, staffing etc.)
SLP 1 year prior
Ensure TIs following government reporting system SLP 6-12 months prior
Develop post-transition
support agreements
Develop a clear post-transition support document,
with clear levels of budget and deliverables
SLP and SACS 1-2 months prior
Back-up support Create a financial reserve in case of delays in
funding disbursement
SLP As per need at handover
Deliver support as agreed in post-transition
support document
SLP As agreed in post-transition support
document
Ongoing monitoring Monthly joint visits with TSU and SLP to provide
monitoring and mentoring support
SLP As agreed in post-transition support
document
Acronyms: CBO – Community Based Organization; NGO – Non-Government Organization; SACS – State AIDS Control Society; SLP – State Lead Partner; TI –Targeted
Intervention; TSU – Technical Support Unit
1TSU – Technical Support Unit
Source: Avahan Common Minimum Programme for Transition
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align the individual goals of staff with the goals being
pursued through transition, it was difficult to address
the broader consequences of transition for staff, particu-
larly the fact that government budgetary norms typically
paid lower salaries for TI staff than under Avahan. Fre-
quently the shift in salary structures was made in ad-
vance of transition as part of the alignment process. This
led to reductions in salary levels although the magnitude
of the drop in salaries varied across states and across
TIs. There was just one exception to this, in the 2011
round of transition in Tamil Nadu the SLP managed to
negotiate with SACS for higher salaries for TI staff, based
on their extensive experience. While the drop in salaries
led to some staff dissatisfaction and staff turnover, in gen-
eral the consequences appeared to be less than many SLPs
or SACS feared.
“It was totally aligned with SACS salaries in March
2010 [two years prior to transition]. We had some staff
turnover when we aligned but it was less than what
we anticipated. We were very pleasantly surprised. We
had this notion, let me be very honest with you, before
aligning we had this notion that “oh! what will
happen? Salaries are so low what will happen. Will
people leave? If there is a mass staff attrition, what we
will do?” We had all those concerns. In fact, this was
one of the most important concerns we had. But when
we actually sat down in this room to restructure the
TIs and align them, we found that there were these
concerns but there were opportunities as well in the
realignment process.” Maharashtra, SLP, 2012 Round
Staff drawn from focal communities (eg. peer educa-
tors) were also affected by lower salaries (as discussed in
Rodriguez et al. forthcoming [28]).
Communicate and inform stakeholders
Managing the mechanics of program transition took a
very high level of investment from Avahan and govern-
ment staff, involving repeated meetings between SLPs
and government counterparts in NACO, SACS, and Tech-
nical Support Units at the state level, and District AIDS
Prevention and Control Units. Avahan appeared to
prioritize this effort with government over engagement with
other stakeholders.
However, Avahan, and in particular the BMGF staff,
perhaps missed opportunities to broaden ownership of
the program by focusing primarily on government stake-
holders. In articulating the goal of transition, the original
transition plan [29] noted three different elements: tran-
sition to government; development of a coalition of part-
ners to sustain impact; and community action to sustain
impact. There were multiple stakeholders in the Avahanprogram beyond government HIV/AIDS organizations,
including HRG community based organizations, other gov-
ernment departments that interacted with the TIs such as
police departments, and a broader array of civil society or-
ganizations concerned about the rights of HRGs and their
access to services. In practice, Avahan efforts to transition
focused primarily on the government HIV/AIDS organiza-
tions and paid little heed to other stakeholders, although in
some cases the mere fact of integrating Avahan TIs into
the government system appears to have strengthened ties
with other government departments.
While Avahan recognized the importance of mobilizing
communities to sustain impact, community mobilization
proved the most difficult aspect to transfer to government
particularly given limited or non-existent government
budgets for such activities. Our follow-up surveys showed
that one year after transition only 64 % of the community
groups supported by the TIs that transitioned in 2011 and
45 % of those supported by TIs that transitioned in 2012
had found additional sources of income. For the commu-
nity groups associated with the 2011 TIs, these revenues
were entirely internal (membership fees and income-
generating activities), although for the 2012 round some
community groups received support from local founda-
tions. In 2012 Avahan developed a third and final
phase, with the aim of providing ongoing community
mobilization support to the community groups associ-
ated with the transitioned TIs.
Generate and disseminate short term wins
While there were many good reasons to phase the tran-
sition process, the 2009 round of transition though small
had been very challenging, thus leading to few obvious
“short term wins” or success stories that could be dissemi-
nated. Conversely, the second round had been much more
successful, but there was limited time between the com-
pletion of the 2011 and 2012 rounds to document and dis-
seminate success.
The lack of early “wins” does not appear to have been
a significant barrier to the overall program of transition.
Respondents from TIs rarely cited other Avahan transition
experiences in their state, whether positive or negative,
and there appeared to be little direct communication be-
tween TIs. However SLPs and BMGF program officers
clearly interacted and shared information about transition
and sometimes multiple TIs were managed by a single
NGO, which also enabled learning across TIs. Overall,
problems during the first transition round appear to have
led to greater efforts between state-level actors to commu-
nicate effectively, suggesting that it sparked positive learn-
ing and action cycles [30].
While there were not obvious short term wins from
the first round of transition, its failures sent a clear mes-
sage to both SLPs and NGOs running TIs that transition
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not ideal. This may have been an important message in
terms of reinforcing commitment to transition, given
that for both these groups of stakeholders, maintaining
the status quo was probably easier than transitioning.
Discussion
Building on change management frameworks, this study
sought to document and assess the main management
practices associated with the transition of the Avahan
program from BMGF to the government of India. The
transition process was completed in a timely fashion, and
our studies of transition readiness indicated relatively high
levels of program alignment, effective communication and
capacity building in both the 2011 and 2012 transition
rounds. Further, we found that 9 months after transition,
key indicators of program performance were sustained.
Therefore, we believe that the management practices de-
scribed here facilitated a relatively smooth and successful
transition process.
After experiencing a multitude of problems associated
with the 2009 transition round, Avahan invested major ef-
forts in developing and implementing operational plans
for transition. Key elements of these transition plans in-
cluded the establishment of transition managers in each
SLP and budget lines to support their activities, negoti-
ation of detailed state level transition plans, regular joint
supervisory visits (between Avahan and government) to
help TIs align with government standards, build-up of
buffer stocks and establishment of post-transition sup-
port agreements. Communicating the goals of transition
to staff and training them in operational practices post-
transition were also important elements of transition
management plans.
However, the detailed management plans described
above would not have been developed or implemented,
if it were not for the establishment of trusting and trans-
parent relationships between government and Avahan
state-level actors. While some of the good management
practices such as staff training could have been imple-
mented by Avahan alone, most needed to be negotiated,
agreed and jointly implemented by Avahan and govern-
ment. The main differences between states in their man-
agement of the transition arose from differences in the
quality of relationships between government and Avahan
actors at the state level. While in three of the states the
relationships became progressively stronger, there was
one which suffered setbacks due to staff rotations.
While this paper has sought to identify transition
management practices that cut across different TIs, in
practice there were many nuances that emerged accord-
ing to the nature of state level relationships (as described
in the paragraph above) as well as features of individual
TIs. For example, there were differences between thoseTIs that transitioned as NGOs, and those that transitioned
as Community Based Organizations (CBOs). NGOs were
typically better prepared for transition, but CBOs tended
to be better at informing and engaging their staff. These
differences highlight the critical importance of local con-
text to managing effective transition, and suggest that
management strategies will likely need to be adapted to
reflect different conditions on the ground.
The lengthy timeline and the phased nature of the
transition stand out as being critical enablers of the good
management practices identified. Through planning tran-
sition in three increasingly large tranches it was possible
to gradually strengthen relationships as well as facilitate
learning. Respondents recognized the importance of learn-
ing from previous rounds, but also the unpredictability of
the process, as one commented: “you plan for ten things,
transition throws eleventh thing to you”(Karnataka, SLP,
2011 Round). One caveat to the phased transition design
was that some respondents thought that the final transi-
tion round, with 70 % of TIs, was too large, and not all of
the management strategies developed in previous rounds
could be effectively applied with such a large group. These
respondents suggested that the size of the second round
could have been increased so as to make the final round
more feasible to transition effectively.
While transition management appeared broadly suc-
cessful, one area that was perhaps relatively overlooked
by Avahan, particularly BMGF staff, was communication
with a wider array of stakeholders. Avahan’s intensive
engagement with government appeared to limit the appe-
tite for engaging other potential partners such as develop-
ment partners, funders, or civil society organizations. This
inclination to focus on core business, at the expense of
building a broader coalition for transition, primarily re-
flects extensive demands on staff time to manage the
transition process, but may have been reinforced by the
departure of some senior BMGF staff prior to the full
transition of the program. While BMGF has sought to
strengthen community engagement during the past two
years, a broader ownership of the transitioned TIs might
help bolster sustainability.
Finally, our analysis suggests that the need to secure
and disseminate “early wins” was not as important to the
Avahan transition process as change management frame-
works suggest. A number of reasons may explain this.
First, this study does not address change within a single
organization where news may travel fast about successes
and failures, but rather across a broad, geographically dis-
tributed, health system. Second, the ragged 2009 transition
round perhaps served to focus people’s minds and con-
vince them of the need for a more structured and planned
approach, which may have been an unexpected benefit.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the fact that the
2009 transition round went ahead despite inadequate
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ners that BMGF was committed to the identified time-
lines and transition would not be derailed by lack of
preparation.
Limitations
This paper has not linked the discussion of management
practices to evidence on the long-term sustainability of
the Avahan program but has instead focused on how
smoothly transition progressed. We focused primarily on
state and TI level actors rather than the national level,
reflecting that for Avahan, many policy decisions regard-
ing transition were resolved by 2009, in other contexts
achieving high-level agreement around transition may be
much harder.
A number of additional factors may limit the transfer-
ability of the Avahan transition management lessons.
First, Avahan addressed prevention needs of HRGs in a
concentrated epidemic, rather than for a generalized epi-
demic: a generalized epidemic would warrant a larger
scale of activities, but government may find it easier to
meet the general population’s needs compared to HRGs’
needs. Second, there has been substantial growth in the
Indian government’s budget for HIV/AIDS since 2004,
which means that there were adequate financial resources
to support transitioned programs. Third, the NACP III
provided a policy framework for HIV/AIDS prevention
among HRGs in India, which closely matched the prin-
ciples of the Avahan program [31]. Finally, there are
relatively high levels of bureaucratic capacity across the
Indian government’s HIV/AIDS administration. Despite
these somewhat distinctive features of the Avahan tran-
sition, we believe that many of the management lessons
are transferable.
Conclusions
Our findings suggest that management of donor transi-
tions is likely to be stronger when:
 There is an extended and sequenced time frame for
transition that facilitates both learning and
development of trusting and transparent
relationships
 Transition processes are co-owned and planned by
both the donor and the government
 Detailed transition planning takes place, supported
by clear guidelines, and close attention is paid to
program alignment (both financial and operational)
and capacity development
 Transition processes are supported by dedicated
staff and transition budgets
 Staff are engaged in the transition process, and
understand both the goals of transition and the
likely consequences of transition Clear communication about the new arrangements
is provided including participation by staff in
decisions about changes in the structure of support.
 A broad array of stakeholders are engaged to
support the program post transition through
enhanced program accountability and additional
financial support
 Actors in charge of transition signal that they are
serious about it and will not be derailed by poor
preparation.
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